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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study assessed whether perspective-taking (considering another’s perspective, 
thoughts, and feelings; Davis, 1983) causes greater distinctive accuracy (judging another’s 
unique traits), normative accuracy (judging another as similar to the average person and 
positively), and distinctive assumed similarity (judging another’s personality as similar to one’s 
own personality) in first impressions of personality. College students (N = 429) received either 
perspective-taking instructions or no specific instructions before watching videos of seven 
individuals (targets) answering getting-to-know-you questions. Participants then rated each 
target’s personality. Taking the targets’ perspectives did not improve distinctive accuracy or 
distinctive assumed similarity. However, participants who reported actively trying or being able 
to take the targets’ perspectives rated those targets more positively (with greater normative 
accuracy). Thus, perspective-taking does not result in more accurate impressions or greater 
perceived similarity, but it may lead to more positive impressions for those who try or are able to 
take another’s perspective. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Forming impressions of others is a part of everyday life, and one’s first impression of 
another person can guide one’s behaviors toward and future interactions with that person. 
Because of the ubiquity of interpersonal interactions in everyday life, accurately perceiving 
others is important for successful social functioning. For instance, accurate first impressions are 
influential when deciding whether to pursue a friendship with a new acquaintance or when an 
employer must judge whether a job candidate will be hard-working and reliable. If these initial 
impressions are inaccurate, new friendships may not be as successful as predicted or new 
employees may fail to meet their employer’s expectations. Indeed, accurately perceiving others 
can have positive social consequences including influencing the development of social 
relationships (Human, Sandstrom, Biesanz, & Dunn, 2013; Luo & Snider, 2009) and 
occupational success (Kristof-Brown, Barrick, & Franke, 2002). Moreover, the ability to form 
accurate interpersonal perceptions is associated with a number of positive intrapersonal 
correlates, including greater social and emotional competence (Hall, Andrzejewski, & Yopchick, 
2009) and higher cognitive ability (Christiansen, Wolcott-Burnam, Janovics, Burns, & Quirk, 
2005). Overall, accurately perceiving others is associated with positive inter- and intrapersonal 
functioning.  
Definitions of perceptual accuracy vary based on the content being perceived and 
assessed, and there are distinct types of accuracy skills (Schlegel, Boone, & Hall, 2017). When 
 2 
perceiving others, people can accurately judge another individual’s emotional state (emotion 
recognition; e.g., Lyusin & Ovsyannikova, 2016), feelings and thoughts (empathic accuracy; 
e.g., Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2008), intentions and beliefs (mental state attribution; e.g., Brüne, 
Abdel-Hamid, Lehmkämper, & Sonntag, 2007), and personality (judgmental accuracy; e.g., 
Funder, 1995). This study examines accurate personality impressions and the distinct 
characteristics and processes that facilitate judgmental accuracy, which requires the 
interpretation of cues to form judgments about stable, trait-level characteristics. Personality 
judgments involve both a target (the individual whose personality is judged) and a perceiver or 
judge (the individual forming the personality judgment). This study is designed to assess the 
utility of perspective-taking (i.e., considering another person's perspective and thoughts/feelings) 
as a method to improve a perceiver’s ability to form accurate personality judgments.  
 
Personality Judgments in First Impressions 
Forming Accurate Personality Judgments 
Both the target and the judge influence the process of forming an accurate personality 
judgment. According to the Realistic Accuracy Model (RAM; Funder, 1995), accurate 
impressions require a four-stage process. First, a target must produce a behavior that is relevant 
to a trait. Second, that relevant behavior must be made available to the judge. Third, the judge 
must detect the relevant and available behavior and, fourth, the judge must correctly utilize the 
relevant, available, and detected behavior. These steps are multiplicative (as opposed to 
additive), such that each step is required for an accurate judgment to be made (Funder, 1995). If 
any step in the RAM process does not occur, then an accurate judgment cannot be formed.  
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Defining Accuracy 
 Personality judgment accuracy has been defined in a number of ways, and there are three 
primary theoretical conceptualizations of accuracy: pragmatic, constructivist, and realistic 
(Funder & West, 1993). From a pragmatic approach, a personality judgment is accurate if it leads 
to successful social interactions (Swann, 1984). In other words, personality impressions are 
accurate in as much as they result in better social functioning for the perceiver. For example, 
Patrick may perceive that his friend Jane likes to be punctual and on time. Because of this, 
Patrick is always on time when he meets Jane, and this allows Patrick to have successful 
interactions with Jane. Conversely, from a constructivist approach, personality judgments are 
considered accurate if there is consensus between judges (Kruglanski, 1989). If numerous people 
agree about a personality judgment, such as the judgment that Jane is conscientious, then that 
judgment is considered accurate. However, high inter-judge consensus does not equate to high 
judgmental accuracy (Blackman & Funder, 1998). Thus, at issue with both the pragmatic and 
constructivist approaches to personality judgments is that what is defined as an accurate 
judgment may not represent an individual’s true personality. That is, even if people are in wide 
agreement that Jane is conscientious (constructivist approach) and this judgment allows people to 
successfully interact with Jane (pragmatic approach), it does not necessarily follow that Jane is 
actually conscientious. Consequently, the pragmatic and constructivist definitions of accurate 
personality judgments do not fully capture accuracy in terms of understanding an individual’s 
personality.    
Alternatively, the realistic approach described in RAM (Funder, 1995), argues that 
personality traits are actual characteristics of individuals (as opposed to consensus or an 
appraisal that allows for successful social functioning). According to RAM, a personality 
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judgment is accurate if it corresponds to multifaceted realistic criteria for what the target is 
actually like, such as the target’s self-reported personality, actual behavior, and ratings of the 
target’s personality given by knowledgeable informants such as friends or family members 
(Funder, 1995). Given that there is no single best source of information about an individual’s 
personality, it is ideal to combine multiple sources. In fact, self-reports of personality may be 
biased in that individuals may inaccurately report their personality either due to a lack of 
knowledge or purposefully, such as reporting their personality in a socially desirable way 
(Paulhus, 1984). In using both self-reports and reports from knowledgeable informants, 
researchers can determine a realistic estimate of an individual’s personality that may be more 
reliable and accurate than an estimate based only on an individual’s self-reported personality. In 
fact, knowledgeable informants can provide unique insight into a person’s personality that may 
not be captured in that person’s self-reported personality (Vazire & Mehl, 2008). Therefore, from 
a realistic perspective, personality judgments about Jane would be accurate if they map onto 
Jane’s report of her own personality, Jane’s actual behaviors, and friends or family members’ 
reports of Jane’s personality. The present study uses a realistic approach to personality within the 
RAM (Funder, 1995) framework.  
 
Statistically Assessing Accuracy 
There are two primary approaches to statistically assessing accurate personality 
judgments: trait and profile approaches. In trait-centered approaches, researchers examine 
accuracy in judging a single attribute across many people, such as examining whether people 
typically understand how agreeable others are. Alternatively, in profile approaches, researchers 
examine accuracy in judging the pattern of multiple attributes within an individual (Furr, 2008). 
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Patrick may accurately judge Jane’s personality profile if he perceives that Jane is higher in 
conscientiousness than extraversion, but lower in neuroticism compared to agreeableness. 
Importantly, normativity (similarity to the average personality) must be accounted for in profile 
approaches. Individual personality profiles tend to reflect the average personality profile 
because, by definition, the majority of people’s personalities will be similar to the average 
personality (Furr, 2008; Rogers, Wood, & Furr, 2018). Moreover, perceivers can form accurate 
judgments on average simply by rating each target as similar to the average person (Edwards, 
1957). To correct for and assess this issue, personality profile accuracy can be measured by 
separating normative and distinctive components (Biesanz, 2010; Rogers et al., 2018).  
Normative accuracy refers to the extent to which a perceiver views an individual as 
similar to the average person (Biesanz, 2010). Thus, Patrick’s impression of Jane is normatively 
accurate if it corresponds to the average person’s personality profile. An estimate of the average 
personality profile can be attained by averaging responses across self-reported personality (e.g., 
Rogers & Biesanz, 2015), thereby creating normative means for each personality trait. Because 
this average personality profile is positive (i.e., people are typically more caring than aggressive) 
and highly socially desirable (Borkenau & Liebler, 1995; Edwards, 1957; Wood, Gosling, & 
Potter, 2007), normative accuracy can signify the positivity of an impression. In other words, 
viewing a target normatively indicates a positive impression of that target. In sum, if Patrick 
views Jane with high normative accuracy, he is viewing her as similar to the average person and, 
thus, positively.  
Distinctive accuracy refers to the degree with which a perceiver’s impression of an 
individual agrees with that individual’s unique and distinctive traits after accounting for the 
average person’s personality profile (Biesanz, 2010; Rogers et al., 2018). As such, distinctive 
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accuracy also involves judging how an individual’s personality is different from other people’s 
personalities and the average person’s personality (Biesanz, 2010; Biesanz & Human, 2010; 
Furr, 2008; Human & Biesanz, 2012). Patrick’s impression of Jane is distinctively accurate if his 
impression corresponds to the unique and distinct components of Jane’s personality profile after 
accounting for the average personality profile. Distinctive accuracy and normative accuracy 
operate independently of one another; perceivers’ judgments can be high in distinctive accuracy 
but low in normative accuracy or low in distinctive accuracy but high in normative accuracy 
(Biesanz, 2010). Thus, if Patrick forms a distinctly accurate impression of Jane that reflects her 
unique personality, this has no effect on how positively he may view her.  
In addition to accuracy, biases such as that of assumed similarity can exist in realistic 
personality judgments and can influence personality impressions. Assumed similarity refers to 
perceiving one’s own characteristics in others (Cronbach, 1955) and has been referred to as a 
“self-based heuristic.” When there is a lack of trait-relevant cues and the trait is difficult to rate 
(such as when judging a target’s levels of neuroticism), the perceiver may use information about 
their own personality to form a judgment about the target (Ready, Clark, Watson, & 
Westerhouse, 2000). Specifically, distinctive assumed similarity refers to perceiving others as 
having one’s own unique, distinguishing pattern of traits (Human & Biesanz, 2012). If Patrick, 
who is more trustworthy than he is talkative, views Jane as also being more trustworthy than 
talkative, then his impression of Jane displays distinctive assumed similarity. Typically, 
measures of distinctive assumed similarity control for the average personality profile and the 
actual similarity between the perceiver and the target (e.g., Human & Biesanz, 2011b; Human & 
Biesanz, 2012). For individual traits, impression accuracy and assumed similarity have an 
inverse relationship such that assumed similarity tends to be low when the impression is accurate 
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(Beer & Watson, 2008; Human & Biesanz, 2012; Watson, Hubbard, & Wiese, 2000). However, 
across perceivers and dyads (i.e., perceiver and target pairs), assumed similarity and accuracy are 
independent of one another (Human & Biesanz, 2012). As a result, it is possible for perceivers to 
form accurate impressions of a target’s personality profile regardless of whether or not the 
perceiver views the target as having a similar pattern of traits to themselves. Overall, distinctive 
and normative accuracy and distinctive assumed similarity are three components of impressions 
used to assess personality judgments and are depicted in the social accuracy model (Biesanz, 
2010) in Figure 1.    
 
 
 
Figure 1   Distinctive accuracy, normative accuracy, and distinctive assumed similarity in the 
social accuracy model 
 
Individual Differences in Accuracy 
Individuals differ in their ability to be judged accurately and to form accurate judgments 
in first impressions. Expressive accuracy refers to the ability to be easily understood by others 
and accurately judged across different perceivers (Biesanz, 2010). Individuals high in expressive 
accuracy, or “good targets,” make trait-relevant cues available to perceivers by providing high 
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quality information about their personality (Letzring & Human, 2014) and about their less 
observable traits (Human & Biesanz, 2011a). For instance, Jane, who is more agreeable than 
neurotic, has high expressive accuracy if she provides cues that she is very cooperative, helpful, 
and interested in others and is not often moody or easily worried. Expressive accuracy is thought 
to be associated with greater psychological adjustment, higher social status, and socialization 
(Human & Biesanz, 2013). Indeed, good targets behave in line with their unique and distinctive 
personality traits, and individuals who are well-adjusted, high in self-esteem, less shy, and highly 
expressive and sociable tend to be higher in expressive accuracy (Ambady, Hallahan, & 
Rosenthal, 1995; Human, Biesanz, Finseth, Pierce, & Le, 2014). Good targets also tend to be 
more engaging and elicit more attention from perceivers (Human et al., 2014). Overall, research 
suggests a wide range of individual differences associated with high expressive accuracy.  
On the other hand, perceptive accuracy refers to the ability to understand others and 
accurately judge others’ personality characteristics across different targets (Biesanz, 2010). The 
“good judge” is someone high in perceptive accuracy. For example, a good judge is able to 
detect that Jane is cooperative and helpful but not moody or worrisome and can correctly 
interpret those cues to mean that Jane is more agreeable than neurotic. A judge’s ability to form 
accurate personality impressions can be influenced by his/her motivation (Biesanz & Human, 
2010), cognitive ability (Christiansen et al., 2005), and knowledge of personality and its 
manifestation in behavior (Funder, 1995; Rogers & Biesanz, 2018). Individuals tend to differ less 
in perceptive accuracy than they do expressive accuracy (Biesanz, 2010), and previous research 
does not clearly depict the defining characteristics of the good judge. Past research suggests that 
individuals high in perceptive accuracy demonstrate good social skills such as maintaining eye 
contact and expressing warmth and sympathy, and good judges tend to be interpersonally 
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oriented, motivated to foster close relationships, psychologically adjusted, and agreeable 
(Letzring, 2008; Vogt & Colvin, 2003). However, these studies do not isolate or assess the 
distinctive and normative components of judgmental accuracy, and past research suggests that 
there are different characteristics associated with being a good distinctive judge versus a good 
normative judge.  
In fact, within perceptive accuracy, there is evidence of greater individual differences in 
the ability to form normatively accurate judgments compared to individual differences in the 
ability to form distinctively accurate judgments (Human & Biesanz, 2011b). Psychologically 
well-adjusted perceivers tend to demonstrate greater normative accuracy but not greater 
distinctive accuracy (Human & Biesanz, 2011b). Females tend to make more normatively 
accurate judgments, but gender does not play a role in distinctively accurate judgments (Chan, 
Rogers, Parisotto, & Biesanz, 2011). Additionally, the good normative judge tends to be high in 
agreeableness, but the Big Five personality traits are not associated with the good distinctive 
judge (Letzring, 2015). Notably, one individual difference associated with both normative and 
distinctive accuracy is empathy. In a study by Colman, Letzring, and Biesanz (2017), 
participants completed the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983), a measure of empathic 
tendencies, before watching videos that depicted target individuals engaged in a conversation. 
Participants who self-reported higher levels of the empathic tendencies of perspective-taking, 
empathic concern, and fantasy made more normatively and distinctively accuracy impressions of 
the targets’ personalities. That is, perceivers with these greater empathic tendencies tended to 
accurately judge targets’ unique personalities while also viewing targets positively. Overall, the 
modest individual differences associated with perceptive accuracy can vary at both the 
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distinctive and normative accuracy levels, but characteristics such as empathy are associated 
with both types of accuracy.   
 
Improving Accuracy 
Past research suggests that perceptive accuracy can be improved through experience and 
training. Professional job recruiters are more accurate in judging applicants’ personalities 
compared to college students with less experience in making such judgments (Schmid Mast, 
Bangerter, Bulliard, & Aerni, 2011), and interviewers are better than strangers in accurately 
judging the personality of applicants (Barrick, Patton, & Haugland, 2000). Moreover, judges 
who are trained to utilize and interpret personality-relevant behavioral cues tend to increase their 
perceptive accuracy (Powell & Bourdage, 2016). Yet, research on improving perceptive accuracy 
through experience and training has only examined accuracy using overall profile correlations, 
which can be contaminated by normative responses, without separately assessing both the 
normative and distinctive components of personality judgments. Thus, it is unclear how 
experience and training affect both normative accuracy and distinctive accuracy in first 
impressions.  
Additionally, experimental manipulations can influence perceptive accuracy. Biesanz and 
Human (2010) experimentally manipulated participants’ motivation to form accurate impressions 
(thereby influencing both the detection and utilization stages of RAM) by providing them with 
an explicit social goal to form an accurate first impression or providing them with no explicit 
goal. Those who were provided with the goal were told that it was important they “form the most 
accurate impression possible for each person.” Participants who were motivated to make 
accurate impressions formed more distinctively accurate but less normatively accurate (positive) 
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impressions compared to individuals who were not motivated to be accurate. As such, further 
research is necessary to determine if there are methods (such as brief instructions that alter how a 
perceiver approaches understanding a target) that could easily be implemented in any 
interpersonal interaction to improve distinctive accuracy without diminishing normative 
accuracy; that is, methods for everyday interpersonal interactions that allow perceivers to 
understand a target’s unique personality without losing impression positivity.  
 
Improving Impression Accuracy Through Perspective-Taking 
Perspective-taking could be a straightforward method that allows perceivers to improve 
their perceptive accuracy (both distinctive and normative accuracy) in various interpersonal 
contexts. Perspective-taking occurs when an individual considers the world from another’s 
viewpoint and tries to understand another’s thoughts, motives, and/or feelings (Davis, 1983; 
Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005; Parker, Atkins, & Axtell, 2008). Perspective-taking is a cognitive 
component of empathy, which refers to the process of how individuals react to and understand 
their observations of others’ experiences and mental states (Davis, 1983; Smith, 2006). As 
opposed to affective empathy, which involves the sharing of emotions through automatic, 
unconscious processes (Smith, 2006; Trent, Park, Bercovitz, & Chapman, 2016), cognitive 
empathy involves interpreting and understanding another person’s experiences, thoughts, and 
feelings (Davis, 1980; Smith, 2006). As such, perspective-taking as a form of cognitive empathy 
involves the detection and interpretation of another individual’s cues to his/her thoughts and 
feelings.  
Perspective-taking can be conceptualized as a trait or a situation-specific cognitive state 
(Duan & Hill, 1996). Typically, perspective-taking research focuses on either measuring 
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perspective-taking as a trait or manipulating perspective-taking as a state. However, past research 
has not labelled these two conceptualizations of perspective-taking. To provide clarity to the 
present study, the two conceptualizations of perspective-taking are termed trait perspective-
taking and state perspective-taking. These terms are not present in existing perspective-taking 
literature, but they are used here to provide a distinction between the two perspective-taking 
processes. First, individuals have trait-level perspective-taking tendencies in which they have a 
greater or lesser tendency to spontaneously take the perspective of others in interpersonal 
interactions (trait perspective-taking). Research on trait perspective-taking would measure this as 
an individual difference (e.g., Colman et al., 2017; Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008; Ku, 
Wang, & Galinsky, 2010). Second, individuals can be instructed to actively take the perspective 
of another person either during an interaction with that person or when perceiving that person in 
a video, picture, or text (state perspective-taking). Research examining state perspective-taking 
would manipulate perspective-taking by providing individuals with instructions to perspective-
take (e.g., Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Sun, Zuo, Wu, & Wen, 2016; 
Todd, Galinsky, & Bodenhausen, 2012). Thus, while both trait and state perspective-taking 
involve adopting another person’s perspective, trait perspective-taking refers to the generalized 
tendency to do so at any given time, while state perspective-taking refers to actively perspective-
taking at a specific time. 
A relationship exists between trait perspective-taking and perceptive accuracy. 
Individuals higher in trait perspective-taking (those who are more likely to take others’ 
perspectives) tend to more accurately match target’s own self-descriptions of their personality 
(Bernstein & Davis, 1982). Moreover, individuals high in trait perspective-taking tend to form 
more distinctively and normatively accurate impressions of targets’ personalities and tend to 
 13 
display greater assumed similarity with targets compared to individuals low in trait perspective-
taking (Colman et al., 2017). In other words, individuals who report that they tend to take others’ 
perspectives are likely to form accurate judgments that align with others’ distinct pattern of traits 
as well as the average personality, and their judgments of others tend to be similar to their own 
personality. Thus, trait perspective-taking is reliably associated with perceptive accuracy, but the 
causal relationship between perspective-taking and perceptive accuracy has yet to be established.  
Perspective-taking may cause improved perceptive accuracy, or there might be other 
characteristics associated with perspective-taking tendencies that contribute to the relationship 
between trait perspective-taking and perceptive accuracy. Trait perspective-taking is associated 
with healthy interpersonal functioning and a higher sensitivity to others’ feelings and reactions 
(Davis, 1983), and these characteristics may contribute to greater perceptive accuracy. 
Alternatively, it may be that individuals high in trait perspective-taking are already high in 
perceptive accuracy, and having the ability to consistently form accurate personality judgments 
has improved their ability to see others’ points of view. Due to the alternative explanations for 
this relationship, it is necessary to establish if perspective-taking actually causes improved 
perceptive accuracy, and this can be determined by examining the relationship between state 
perspective-taking and the three previously discussed components of impressions: distinctive 
accuracy, normative accuracy, and distinctive assumed similarity.  
 
Distinctive Accuracy 
Given that perspective-taking involves the detection and interpretation of another 
individual’s cues regarding his/her thoughts and feelings (Davis, 1980; Smith, 2006), 
perspective-taking may enhance both the detection and utilization stages of RAM (Funder, 1995) 
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when forming personality judgments. Specifically, state perspective-taking could theoretically 
influence distinctive accuracy by improving a perceiver’s ability to detect target cues through 
increased attention and improving a perceiver’s ability to utilize target cues through increased 
cognitive complexity. The following paragraphs discuss how increased attention and increased 
cognitive complexity should improve distinctive accuracy.  
 
Attention 
 One way in which state perspective-taking could improve a judge’s ability to detect 
target cues is through increased attention, and paying more attention to an individual is 
associated with greater distinctive accuracy. Judges tend to pay more attention to attractive and 
engaging targets and, as a result tend to make more distinctively accurate impressions of those 
targets (Human et al., 2014; Lorenzo, Biesanz, & Human, 2010). Research on attention and 
impressions has focused on how target characteristics influence the detection stage of 
interpersonal impressions by increasing the attention of the judge. However, state perspective-
taking could be a method that allows for increased attention of the judge toward the target 
without relying on a target with attention-getting characteristics.  
State perspective-taking should theoretically direct more of the perceiver’s attention 
towards the target. Indeed, being able to take another’s perspective requires effortful attention; 
that is, perceivers cannot take a target's perspective unless they are first paying attention to the 
target (Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010). Logically, in order to form a concept of another individual’s 
unique perspective, thoughts, and feelings, a perceiver must first direct his/her attention toward 
that individual. As a result, the perceiver should be able to detect more of the relevant cues to a 
target’s unique personality, a crucial step toward forming distinctively accurate personality 
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judgments. However, according to the multiplicative nature of RAM (Funder, 1995), increased 
attention alone is not enough to form an accurate personality judgment. For increased attention to 
improve distinctive accuracy in impressions, the target’s cues must also be correctly utilized and 
interpreted.    
 
Cognitive Complexity 
Cognitive complexity refers to the capacity to perceive, differentiate, and integrate 
information in one’s social environment (Bowler, Bowler, & Cope, 2012; Ku, Wang, & 
Galinsky, 2015). Greater cognitive complexity allows individuals to perceive more elements in 
their social environment and better organize and interpret those elements (Bowler, Bowler, & 
Phillips, 2009). Funder (1995) argues that judgmental abilities such as cognitive complexity can 
improve a judge’s ability to detect and correctly utilize cues. In fact, cognitive complexity is a 
fundamental effect of perspective-taking, such that after taking another person’s perspective, 
perceivers demonstrate greater cognitive complexity (Ku et al., 2015). The very act of 
considering a target’s perspective leads individuals to deviate from their default mental routines 
and use more cognitively demanding information processing that allows them to perceive and 
integrate a broader range of information in their social environment (Ku et al., 2015; Todd et al., 
2012). This enhanced ability to differentiate and integrate social information should aid a 
perceiver in correctly utilizing a target’s cues.  
Plentiful research provides evidence of increased cognitive complexity as a result of state 
perspective-taking. State perspective-taking reduces the fundamental attribution error (Hooper, 
Erdogan, Keen, Lawton, & McHugh, 2015), and individuals who engage in state perspective-
taking recall more stereotype-inconsistent behaviors and display less confirmatory thinking by 
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seeking more hypothesis-inconsistent information (Todd et al., 2012). Moreover, perspective-
taking reduces reliance on default cognitive processes such as stereotyping. State perspective-
taking weakens stereotype maintenance processes such as information solicitation and behavior 
explanation (Todd et al., 2012). Additionally, state perspective-taking consistently decreases 
stereotyping, prejudice, and intergroup bias associated with the target and the target’s group 
(Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Vescio, 
Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003) as well as creating positive evaluations of a target’s group (Vescio et 
al., 2003). In fact, perspective-taking reduces both positive and negative stereotyping. In a study 
examining perspective-taking and stereotyping, perceivers who took the perspective of a doctor 
subsequently judged the doctor as being less stereotypically analytic and smart (a positive 
stereotype), and perceivers who took the perspective of a laborer judged the laborer less in line 
with the negative stereotype of not being analytic and smart (Wang, Ku, Tai, & Galinsky, 2014). 
Overall, these findings suggest that individuals who take the perspective of a target rely less on 
default mental processes, use more effortful information processing, and demonstrate an 
improved ability to utilize cues relevant to a target.  
When forming an impression, an increased ability to interpret information should allow 
state perspective-takers to better utilize the trait-relevant cues and form more accurate 
personality judgments. Moreover, this theoretical increase in cognitive complexity should allow 
judges to recognize the target’s unique and distinctive traits as well as understand how the 
target’s range of traits compares to the average person’s personality. However, according to 
RAM (Funder, 1995), increased cognitive complexity will only facilitate distinctive accuracy if 
the perceiver is first able to detect the target’s cues. Overall, state perspective-taking could 
improve distinctive accuracy if it is associated with perceivers paying more attention to the target 
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(detecting more cues) or demonstrating greater cognitive complexity to better utilize trait-
relevant cues in their judgments of the target’s personality.  
 
Normative Accuracy 
The judgment process outlined in RAM (Funder, 1995) makes predictions only for 
distinctively accurate judgments (Rogers & Biesanz, 2018). That is, the theoretical increase in 
attention and cognitive complexity that may facilitate the detection and utilization stages for 
distinctive accuracy are not predicted to influence normative accuracy. Rather, because 
normatively accurate judgments index the positivity of an impression, state perspective-taking 
may theoretically increase normative accuracy due to increased liking for the perspective-taking 
target. Davis, Conklin, Smith, and Luce (1996) found that perceivers who took the perspective of 
a target depicted in a scripted video interview liked the target more than perceivers who did not 
take the target’s perspective. Moreover, individuals who take the perspective of a stereotyped 
target tend to form more positive evaluations of that target (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). 
Because state perspective-taking promotes liking and positive evaluations, state perspective-
taking should result in more positive, normatively accurate impressions of the target. Indeed, 
greater liking is associated with greater normative accuracy (Human et al., 2013). Moreover, 
while previous research suggests that factors such as motivation actually decrease normative 
accuracy and positive impressions (Biesanz & Human, 2010), state perspective-taking could be a 
method to improve distinctive accuracy without losing impression positivity. 
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Distinctive Assumed Similarity 
In addition to influencing impression accuracy, state perspective-taking should also 
influence impressions by increasing distinctive assumed similarity in perceivers’ judgments. 
Specifically, state perspective-taking should theoretically influence distinctive assumed 
similarity by increasing the perceived self-other overlap between a perceiver and a target as the 
cognitive representations of the self and the target overlap (Davis et al., 1996). This merging of 
self and other occurs in both directions, with the target becoming more “self-like” (Davis et al., 
1996; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) and the self becoming more “other-like” (Galinsky, 
Maddux, et al., 2008). In other words, after perspective-taking, the perspective-taker sees more 
of their own characteristics in the target while at the same time seeing more of the target’s 
characteristics in themselves (Galinsky et al., 2005; Ku et al., 2010). In a study by Galinsky, 
Wang, and Ku (2008), participants listened to an audio interview of a college professor (a 
stereotypically analytical target) and were instructed to either take the professor’s perspective 
during the interview or listen to the interview objectively. Participants who took the perspective 
of the professor performed better on an analytic reasoning task compared to those who did not 
take the professor’s perspective, illustrating increased self-other overlap as perspective-takers 
applied the target’s stereotypical traits to themselves. Increased self-other overlap should result 
in greater levels of distinctive assumed similarity in perceivers’ personality judgments as judges 
apply their own characteristics to the targets. Because this bias operates independently of 
distinctive accuracy (e.g., Human & Biesanz, 2012), increased self-other overlap will not play a 
role in the distinctive or normative accuracy of perceivers’ judgments.  
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The Potential for Decreased Accuracy 
A number of factors may inhibit state perspective-taking’s beneficial effects on 
personality judgments. First, the increased self-other overlap resulting from perspective-taking 
may result in judgments that are too similar to the perceiver’s own personality. Perspective-
takers may over-apply their own self-concept and personality characteristics to the target and, as 
a result, may not perceive the target’s unique and distinct traits. While this may increase 
distinctive assumed similarity and positivity, it could also decrease distinctive accuracy if taken 
to the extreme.  
Second, perceiver characteristics may alter the way in which perspective-taking improves 
cognitive complexity and, consequently, distinctive accuracy. Perspective-taking’s effects on 
stereotyping are not consistently positive, and some individuals do not exhibit greater cognitive 
complexity after taking another’s perspective. State perspective-taking is not as effective in 
reducing stereotyping for individuals who are naturally low in self-esteem or manipulated to feel 
lower in self-esteem (Galinsky & Ku, 2004). Additionally, individuals who have fewer 
prejudicial attitudes tend to view outgroup members less positively after taking outgroup 
members’ perspectives compared to individuals with greater prejudicial attitudes (Vorauer, 
Martens, & Sasaki, 2009). Consequently, various perceiver characteristics may influence a 
perceiver’s ability to deviate from their default cognitive processing, and this could influence 
their ability to utilize cues and form distinctively accurate personality judgments.  
Third, perspective-taking may play no role in improving accuracy if the judge and the 
target are already very similar. Recent research suggests that in order for perspective-taking to be 
impactful the target must be sufficiently recognized as distinct from the self (Sassenrath, 
Sassenberg, & Scholl, 2014; Todd, Hanko, Galinsky, & Mussweiler, 2011). If the judge 
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perceives the target to be someone very similar to him/herself, adopting the target’s perspective 
may not provide any new information to the perceiver to utilize when forming their judgment. In 
this case, state perspective-taking may play no role in the perceiver’s judgment.  
Finally, recent findings suggest that perspective-taking does not improve perceivers' 
accuracy in judging other individuals’ thoughts, emotions, or attitudes (Eyal, Steffel, & Epley, 
2018), suggesting that the top-down approach of perspective-taking may not be as effective in 
understanding another’s thoughts and feelings compared to a more bottom-up approach (such as 
directly asking a person about their perspective). However, judging personality is not the same as 
judging emotions or intentions (Schlegel et al., 2017). Moreover, in the research conducted by 
Eyal and colleagues (2018), interpersonal accuracy was estimated using brief, standardized 
measures, an assessment approach that is different from assessing the realistic accuracy of 
personality judgments. As such, while perspective-taking may not improve emotion recognition, 
empathic accuracy, or mental state attribution, this does not indicate that perspective-taking 
should not improve personality judgment accuracy. The findings of the present study will 
contribute to understanding the effectiveness of top-down processes such as perspective-taking 
in facilitating various types of interpersonal accuracy.  
 
Conclusion and Hypotheses 
Given the importance of accurate personality impressions to successful social 
functioning, it is beneficial to determine if perspective-taking can improve both the distinctive 
and normative components of perceptive accuracy across perceivers. While trait perspective-
taking is reliably associated with accurate personality judgments (Bernstein & Davis, 1982; 
Colman et al., 2017), this study is designed to determine if state perspective-taking causes 
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improved perceptive accuracy. Prompting a perceiver to take the perspective of a target should 
theoretically lead the perceiver to devote more attention to the target and should improve the 
perceiver’s cognitive capacity to perceive, discriminate, and integrate trait-relevant information. 
This effect should allow the perceiver to form impressions that are accurate in terms of the 
target’s unique and distinctive traits, thereby increasing distinctive accuracy. Additionally, just as 
trait perspective-taking is associated with increased normative accuracy and distinctive assumed 
similarity (Colman et al., 2017), it is expected that these relationships will be replicated with 
state perspective-taking. State perspective-taking should theoretically result in increased liking 
for the target, contributing to more positive (normatively accurate) impressions. State 
perspective-taking should also produce greater self-other overlap, thereby affecting the process 
through which personality impressions are formed and resulting in increased distinctive assumed 
similarity.  
Compared to methods that improve distinctive accuracy but reduce normative accuracy, 
such as increasing accuracy motivation (Biesanz & Human, 2010), state perspective-taking may 
be a method that improves both types of accuracy. Improving both components of accuracy is 
beneficial as distinctive accuracy will facilitate accurate impressions for specific individuals, and 
normative accuracy will promote impression positivity. It is also beneficial to determine methods 
that increase distinctive assumed similarity given that greater perceived similarity between a 
perceiver and target is associated with beneficial interpersonal outcomes such as positive 
relationship development (Sunnafrank & Ramirez, 2004) and greater friendship intensity 
(Selfhout, Denissen, Branje, & Meeus, 2009). State perspective-taking could easily be 
implemented by individuals in various interactions such as employment hiring situations or when 
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deciding whether to pursue a new friendship as a simple method to improve first impression 
accuracy, positivity, and perceived similarity.  
In addition to furthering research on impression accuracy, examining how state 
perspective-taking influences impressions contributes to the literature on the consequences of 
perspective-taking. The majority of research on perspective-taking has examined its positive and 
negative outcomes usually using a single target and measuring a single consequence, such as 
stereotyping. This study examines the objective outcome of impression accuracy using numerous 
items and multiple targets. As such, the current study aims to produce more reliable effects of 
perspective-taking and greater ecological validity. Moreover, while previous perspective-taking 
research has used a social cognitive approach to perceptions by examining specific 
characteristics of individuals (such as whether they are analytic or passionate; e.g., Wang et al., 
2014), the present study uses a naturalistic, personality approach to understanding perceptions. 
An additional consideration for the effectiveness of state perspective-taking on perceptive 
accuracy is the potential moderating role of trait perspective-taking. Compared to perceivers who 
report being low in trait perspective-taking, those who report being high in trait perspective-
taking will likely have more experience in taking others’ perspectives, may simply be better at 
perspective-taking, and may find it easier or less cognitively demanding to perspective-take. 
Additionally, for those high in trait perspective-taking, state perspective-taking may promote the 
feeling of authenticity and being true to one’s own personality (e.g., Lenton, Bruder, Slabu, & 
Sedikides, 2013). These factors may result in state perspective-taking being more effective in 
improving perceptive accuracy for those high in trait perspective-taking. Alternatively, it is 
possible that directing purposeful attention to state perspective-taking may feel foreign to those 
higher in trait perspective-taking as it is something they already do implicitly. This could 
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potentially result in state perspective-taking being less effective in improving perceptive 
accuracy for those higher in trait perspective-taking. 
In the present study, participants received either perspective-taking instructions or no 
specific instructions before perceiving targets depicted in videos. I hypothesized that perceivers 
who received perspective-taking instructions would form impressions that were more 
distinctively and normatively accurate and would display greater levels of distinctive assumed 
similarity compared to perceivers who did not receive perspective-taking instructions. Additional 
exploratory analyses examined the general relationship between trait perspective-taking and 
impressions and assessed whether the relationship between state perspective-taking and 
impressions is moderated by trait perspective-taking; that is, if state perspective-taking is most 
effective in increasing distinctive accuracy, normative accuracy, and distinctive assumed 
similarity for those higher in trait perspective-taking. No a priori hypotheses were proposed for 
these exploratory analyses.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Overview 
 Participants completed the study in small groups and viewed videos of individuals 
answering basic getting-to-know-you questions. After each video, participants rated the 
personality of the individual in the video. Participants also reported their own personality and 
demographics information. Sessions were randomly assigned to either a perspective-taking or a 
control condition.  
 
Participants 
 Participants included 429 students (334 women, 93 men, 2 other) from the University of 
Tennessee at Chattanooga who were recruited through an online recruitment system (n = 328) 
and from courses (n = 101). A sample size of at least 400 ensures the ability to detect small to 
moderate effect sizes. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 51 (Mage = 19.70 years, SDage = 3.15). 
71.1% were White/Caucasian, 13.5% Black/African American, 5.1% Hispanic, 3.7% Asian, 
4.4% other, and 2.1% unknown. Participants received extra course credit for their voluntary 
participation and were also entered into a drawing to win one of 15 $20 gift cards.  
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Materials 
Target Videos 
Seven target videos depicted seven unique targets (6 female, ages 18-22, Mage = 19.43, 
SDage = 1.62) answering typical getting-to-know-you questions such as what they enjoy doing, 
their plans for the future, and their biggest accomplishments. Each video ranged from 39 s to 2 
min 40 s in length (M = 1 min 42 s, SD = 40.37 s). The target videos were previously included in 
a piloting process in which numerous perceivers rated each target’s personality (Warner, 2018). 
Peer and parent reports of each target’s personality were obtained in this pilot study in order to 
have a reliable measure of each target’s personality. The piloting process also determined that 
each target was high in expressive accuracy, indicating that the targets in these videos provide 
adequate trait-relevant cues and, as a result, are likely to be judged accurately in perceivers’ first 
impressions of the targets. This characteristic was used because perceivers are able to accurately 
judge a target’s personality only if that target displays relevant cues to his/her personality 
(Rogers & Biesanz, 2018), and using good targets allows for greater variability in perceptive 
accuracy. Additionally, using target videos rather than face-to-face interactions allows for the 
direct examination of state perspective-taking’s influence on a perceiver’s perceptive accuracy 
with little situational variability. While judges can influence the relevance or availability of a 
target’s cues in face-to-face interactions, any association between perspective-taking and the 
relevance/availability stages of RAM can be controlled when using a video impressions 
paradigm. That is, a video impressions paradigm allows for a focus specifically on the 
association between perspective-taking and the detection and utilization stages of RAM.  
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Perspective-Taking Manipulation 
Previous research has primarily used two methods to instruct participants to actively take 
the perspective of a target: (1) the individual can consider/imagine the target’s perspective and 
what the target is thinking and/or feeling (imagine-other instructions) or (2) the individual can 
imagine how he/she would think or feel in the target’s position (imagine-self instructions; Batson 
et al., 1997; Myers, Laurent, & Hodges, 2014). Imagine-other instructions were used in the 
present study as opposed to imagine-self instructions based on several considerations. First, 
research on perspective-taking typically adjusts the perspective-taking instructions to the domain 
of interest (Ku et al., 2015). In examining first impressions of personality, paradigms are 
designed to direct the judge’s attention toward the target. In fact, imagine-self instructions lead to 
more self-related thoughts than imagine-other instructions, and imagine-other instructions lead to 
more target-related thoughts than imagine-self instructions (Davis et al., 2004). Therefore, 
imagine-other instructions were used to direct perceivers’ attention toward the targets rather than 
toward themselves.  
Second, most research regarding the differing outcomes of imagine-self and imagine-
other perspective-taking instructions has examined self-other overlap, with some studies 
indicating increased self-other overlap for both instructions (Davis et al., 1996) and others 
indicating differing effects on self-other overlap for the different instructions (Batson et al., 
1997; Myers et al., 2014). These inconsistencies may be due to methodological differences, with 
some studies depicting targets in photographs, video tapes of scripted interviews, or audio 
recordings. However, given the differences in paradigms used in previous research with those 
used in this study, the findings regarding perspective-taking instructions and self-other overlap 
are not as relevant in determining which instructions are best to improve impression accuracy. 
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As such, the most applicable findings are those of Davis et al. (2004), who examined the 
frequency of target- and self-related thoughts and who used a similar paradigm to the current 
study in which participants watched a video of a target. Thus, the present study used imagine-
other instructions in order to decrease self-related thoughts and increase target-related thoughts.  
Participants in the perspective-taking condition received the following instructions: 
“When watching each interview, take the perspective of the person being interviewed. That is, 
try to imagine how the person is feeling and what the person is thinking. In your mind’s eye, try 
to visualize clearly and vividly how they feel during the interview and how they feel and think 
during their day.” These perspective-taking instructions were adapted from those used by 
Galinsky, Wang, et al. (2008), as they are effective in producing perspective-taking effects (d = 
1.05) and are comparable in content to previously used imagine-other instructions (e.g., Davis et 
al., 2004). Similar perspective-taking instructions have been used in studies examining state 
perspective-taking’s effects on empathy, stereotypical behavior, and target- and self-related 
thoughts in which targets are presented through audio tapes and videos as having stereotypical 
characteristics or having experienced difficult circumstances (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; Davis et 
al., 2004; Galinsky, Wang, et al., 2008). Additionally, the perspective-taking instructions 
emphasized thoughts and feelings because distinctive accuracy tends to increase when 
interaction partners are instructed to talk about their thoughts and feelings in various situations, 
and normative accuracy also tends to increase as the amount of information about thoughts and 
feelings available during an interaction increases (Letzring & Human, 2014).  
 
 
 
 28 
Personality Measure 
Participants self-reported their personality using Saucier’s mini-marker scale (Saucier, 
1994; see Appendix B). This 40-item scale measures the Big Five personality traits of openness, 
agreeableness, extraversion, emotional stability, and conscientiousness. Each trait was measured 
using an 8-item subscale, and responses were measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly). Descriptive statistics for this measure are presented in 
Table 1.  
Participants rated each target’s personality using the same 40 items and responded to nine 
additional items measuring other aspects that play an important role in interpersonal interactions, 
including two items measuring attention, two items measuring liking, and one item measuring 
perceived closeness (see Appendix C). Because perceived closeness and self-other overlap are 
highly related (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992), and because state perspective-taking most 
strongly affects the perceived closeness factor of self-other overlap (Myers & Hodges, 2012), 
perceived closeness was used in this study to provide a measure of self-other overlap. Past 
perspective-taking research has measured self-other overlap using the Inclusion of Self in Other 
scale in which participants are presented with seven pairs of circles that increase in the amount 
they overlap (Aron et al., 1992). This study measured perceived closeness with a modified 
version of this item, in which the seven pairs of circles moved further apart rather than closer 
together (responses were reverse-coded such that higher values indicated greater perceived 
closeness).  
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Trait Perspective-Taking 
Participants self-reported their trait perspective-taking tendencies using the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980; see Appendix D). This 28-item scale measures four domains 
of empathy: perspective-taking, fantasy, empathic concern, and personal distress. Each domain 
was measured using a 7-item subscale, and responses were measured on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (does not describe me well) to 7 (describes me very well), with higher scores 
indicating higher empathic tendencies and higher trait perspective-taking. Because past research 
has operationalized trait perspective-taking with the IRI perspective-taking subscale (e.g., 
Colman et al., 2017), this subscale was examined for the present study. Descriptive statistics for 
the IRI are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1  Descriptive Statistics for Self-Report Measures 
 
Self-Report Measure Mean SD Reliability () 
Saucier’s Mini-Markers    
     Openness  5.30 1.31 0.77 
     Agreeableness 5.74 1.19 0.80 
     Extraversion 4.54 1.61 0.86 
     Emotional Stability 4.35 1.55 0.80 
     Conscientiousness 5.25 1.36 0.83 
IRI    
     Perspective-Taking 5.16 1.46 0.79 
     Fantasy 4.88 1.78 0.81 
     Empathic Concern 5.58 1.38 0.81 
     Personal Distress 3.46 1.64 0.80 
 
 
Manipulation Check 
To determine the effectiveness of the perspective-taking manipulation, after watching all 
seven target videos, participants responded to two items. The first item (referred to as the “Try” 
item) asked: “As you were watching the videos, how much did you try to adopt the perspective of 
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the individuals being interviewed?” The second item, (referred to as the “Able” item) asked: “In 
general, to what extent were you able to adopt the perspective of the individuals being 
interviewed?” Responses to these items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(not at all) to 5 (very much), and higher scores on these items indicate greater effectiveness of 
the perspective-taking manipulation for participants in the perspective-taking condition. 
Descriptive statistics for the manipulation check items are presented in Table 2. Similar 
manipulation checks have been used in previous research on perspective-taking, and findings in 
these studies suggest that individuals do generally have insight into their perspective-taking 
efforts (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2004; Eyal et al., 2018; Sun et al., 2016).  
 
Table 2   Descriptive Statistics for Manipulation Check Items 
 
Manipulation Check Items Mean SD 
“Try” Item   
Both Conditions 4.18 0.89 
Control 3.92 1.04 
Perspective-Taking 4.45 0.63 
“Able” Item   
Both Conditions 3.62 0.88 
Control 3.49 0.97 
Perspective-Taking 3.75 0.76 
 
 
Demographics 
Participants completed a 5-item demographics questionnaire asking about their age, 
gender, ethnicity, major, and class rank (see Appendix E). This demographic information was 
used to descriptively understand the makeup of the sample.  
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Procedure 
This study was a between-subjects experimental design. Participants completed the study 
in groups of one to 21 (Mdn = 2, IQR = 1-3) in one hour sessions. There were a total of 155 
groups of participants. 377 participants completed the study materials using tablets, 31 used 
paper and pencil, and 21 used classroom computers. Each session was randomly assigned to 
either a perspective-taking condition or a control condition. After providing informed consent, 
participants reported their own personality and trait perspective-taking and answered the 
demographics questions. Next, participants watched seven target videos (video block). Before 
the video block began, all participants in both conditions received the same general instructions 
that they would be watching videos clips of seven people answering questions about themselves 
and that after each video clip they would complete questionnaires about the person they had just 
seen. After these initial instructions, participants in the perspective-taking condition received the 
perspective-taking instructions, and participants in the control condition did not receive any 
additional instructions. In this way, any differences in impressions between the control and 
perspective-taking conditions can be attributed to this difference in additional instructions. After 
watching each video, participants rated the personality of each target. Participants in the 
perspective-taking condition were reminded of the perspective-taking instructions before the 
fourth video. Once participants finished watching the target videos, they responded to the 
manipulation check questions. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation.  
Prior to analyzing the data, participants’ impressions data was removed if they either 
knew the target in the video (n = 134 impressions, 4.51% of impressions) or if their responses to 
the personality impressions items for a target did not vary (SD = 0; n = 0). Additionally, 
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unexpected technical problems with the target videos and tablets resulted in data from five 
participants being excluded from the analyses. As a result, 420 participants were included in the 
final analysis, and the total number of impressions (number of targets rated) for each participant 
ranged from one to seven (Mdn = 7).  
 
Data Analytic Procedure 
 Data were analyzed using the social accuracy model (SAM; Biesanz, 2010), a crossed-
random effects model which allows for the examination of perceptive and expressive accuracy 
across many traits. The analytic model to estimate distinctive and normative accuracy and 
distinctive assumed similarity across perceivers is represented in Equation 1.1: 
 Yijk = β0ij + β1ijTValjk + β2ijNormk + β3ijPSelfik +  εijk (1.1) 
 β0ij = β00 + β01 + u0i + u0j  
 β1ij = β10 + β11 + u1i + u1j  
 β2ij = β20 + β21 + u2i + u2j  
 β3ij = β30 + β31 + u3i + u3j   
Here, Yijk is perceiver i’s rating of target j on item k. TValjk is the validity measure composite of 
self-, peer-, and parent reports (obtained in the previous pilot study; i.e., Warner, 2018) for target 
j on item k and is deviated from the normative profile. Normk is the normative mean 
(participants’ average self-report) for item k and is grand mean centered. PSelfik is perceiver i’s 
self-report on item k and is deviated from the normative profile.  
β1ij is the distinctive accuracy for perceiver i’s rating of target j while holding the 
average personality profile (Normk) constant. Distinctive accuracy refers to the 
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correspondence between the target’s personality and the perceiver’s ratings of the target’s 
personality. 
β2ij captures normative accuracy for perceiver i’s rating of target j and refers to the 
correspondence between the perceiver’s ratings of the target’s personality and the 
average personality profile. 
β3ij is the level of distinctive assumed similarity for perceiver i’s rating of target j, and 
refers to the correspondence between the perceiver’s ratings of the target’s personality 
and the perceiver’s own self-reported personality while controlling for the average 
personality profile and actual similarity between the perceiver and the target. 
 
State Perspective-Taking and Perceptive Accuracy 
To address the main hypothesis and determine if state perspective-taking improves 
distinctive accuracy, normative accuracy, and distinctive assumed similarity, each of the 
coefficients from Equation 1.1 were decomposed into their own regression equations represented 
in Equation 1.2. In these functions of fixed and random effects, the perspective-taking 
experimental manipulation (PTi) was dummy coded as 0 = no perspective-taking instructions 
(control) and 1 = perspective-taking instructions. 
 β0ij = β00 + β01PTi + u0i + u0j (1.2) 
 β1ij = β10 + β11PTi + u1i + u1j  
 β2ij = β20 + β21PTi + u2i + u2j  
 β3ij = β30 + β31PTi + u3i + u3j   
The primary coefficients of interest are illustrated in Figure 2. β10, β20, and β30 represent the 
average levels of distinctive accuracy, normative accuracy, and distinctive assumed similarity, 
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respectively, across all perceivers and targets for perceivers in the control condition (no 
perspective-taking instructions). β11, β21, and β31 are interactions that capture the difference 
between the control condition and the perspective-taking condition for distinctive accuracy, 
normative accuracy, and distinctive assumed similarity, respectively.  
 
 
 
Figure 2  The social accuracy model extended to include perspective-taking as a moderator of 
distinctive accuracy (β11), normative accuracy (β21), and distinctive assumed similarity 
(β31) 
 
 
Exploratory Analyses 
Two different analyses were employed to assess the moderating role of trait perspective-
taking in impressions. First, to determine whether trait perspective-taking moderates the 
relationship between state perspective-taking and distinctive accuracy, normative accuracy, and 
distinctive assumed similarity, trait perspective-taking (each perceiver’s mean score on the 
perspective-taking subscale of the IRI; TPTi) was grand-mean centered and added as a second 
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moderator to Equation 1.2.The functions of fixed and random effects for this analysis are 
represented in Equation 1.3. 
 β0ij = β00 + β01PTi + β02TPTi + β03PTi ∗ TPTi + u0i + u0j (1.3) 
 β1ij = β10 + β11PTi + β12TPTi + β13PTi ∗ TPTi + u1i + u1j  
 β2ij = β20 + β21PTi + β22TPTi + β23PTi ∗ TPTi + u2i + u2j  
 β3ij = β30 + β31PTi + β32TPTi + β33PTi ∗ TPTi + u3i + u3j   
Here, β13 represents the three-way interaction between state perspective-taking, trait perspective-
taking, and distinctive accuracy and assesses whether trait perspective-taking moderates the 
relationship between state perspective-taking and distinctive accuracy. β23 captures the three-
way interaction between state perspective-taking, trait perspective-taking, and normative 
accuracy and measures whether trait perspective-taking moderates the state perspective-taking 
and normative accuracy relationship. β33 represents the three-way interaction between state 
perspective-taking, trait perspective-taking, and distinctive assumed similarity and estimates how 
trait perspective-taking moderates the relationship between state perspective-taking and 
distinctive assumed similarity. 
 Second, to determine whether trait perspective-taking is associated with greater 
distinctive accuracy, normative accuracy, and distinctive assumed similarity (thereby replicating 
findings by Colman et al., 2017), the following analyses were first conducted collapsed across 
both conditions and then separately for perceivers in the control condition and perceivers in the 
perspective-taking condition. Each of the coefficients from Equation 1.1 were decomposed into 
their own regression equations represented in Equation 1.4. In these functions of fixed and 
random effects, trait perspective-taking was introduced as a moderator (TPTi). 
 β0ij = β00 + β01TPTi + u0i + u0j (1.4) 
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 β1ij = β10 + β11TPTi + u1i + u1j  
 β2ij = β20 + β21TPTi + u2i + u2j  
 β3ij = β30 + β31TPTi + u3i + u3j   
Here, β11 represents the relationship between trait perspective-taking and distinctive accuracy,  
β21 captures the relationship between trait perspective-taking and normative accuracy, and β31 
represents the relationship between trait perspective-taking and distinctive assumed similarity.  
 37 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
General Impression Accuracy 
 On average across conditions, perceivers formed judgments that were significantly 
distinctively and normatively accurate, and their judgments displayed significant levels of 
distinctive assumed similarity (see Table 3). In general, perceivers understood targets’ distinctive 
personalities, viewed targets positively, and judged targets as having a similar personality to 
themselves.  
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Table 3   Personality Judgment Accuracy 
 
Parameter Estimate (SE) 
Fixed Effects  
            Intercept -0.02 (0.06) 
            Distinctive Accuracy 0.29 (0.08)* 
            Normative Accuracy 0.73 (0.08)*** 
            Distinctive Assumed Similarity 0.12 (0.01)*** 
Random Effects   
            Perceiver (Perceptive Accuracy)  
                Intercept 0.24*** 
                Distinctive Accuracy 0.13*** 
                Normative Accuracy 0.27*** 
                Distinctive Assumed Similarity 0.14*** 
            Target (Expressive Accuracy)  
                Intercept 0.14*** 
                Distinctive Accuracy 0.21*** 
                Normative Accuracy 0.21*** 
                Distinctive Assumed Similarity 0.02*** 
            Residual SD 1.26 
Sample Sizes  
            Perceivers 420 
            Targets  7 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001  
 
Perspective-Taking and Impressions 
 As expected, perceivers in the perspective-taking condition reported trying to take the 
targets’ perspectives significantly more than perceivers in the control condition (b = 0.53, p < 
0.001), indicating that the perspective-taking manipulation was effective. Moreover, those in the 
perspective-taking condition indicated that they were able to take the targets’ perspectives 
significantly more than those in the control condition (b = 0.26, p = 0.002). Responses to the 
“Try” manipulation check item and the “Able” manipulation check item were significantly 
related (r = 0.50, p < 0.01). Trait perspective-taking did not differ significantly between 
perceivers in the perspective-taking condition and those in the control condition (b = -0.15, p = 
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0.11). In sum, the perspective-taking manipulation was effective, and random assignment was 
successful in creating groups that did not significantly differ in trait perspective-taking.  
 
State Perspective-Taking and Perceptive Accuracy 
 Contrary to what was hypothesized, perceivers in the perspective-taking condition did not 
form judgments significantly greater in distinctive accuracy compared to perceivers in the 
control condition. Additionally, perceivers in the perspective-taking condition did not form 
judgments higher in normative accuracy (positivity) than perceivers in the control condition. 
Finally, judgments by perceivers in the perspective-taking condition did not display significantly 
greater distinctive assumed similarity than judgments by perceivers in the control condition (see 
Table 4 and Figure 3). Thus, counter to what was expected, state perspective-taking did not 
improve perceivers’ ability to understand the targets’ unique personalities, did not improve 
impression positivity, and did not change the extent to which perceivers viewed the target as 
being similar to themselves. 
 
Table 4   State Perspective-Taking (SPT) and Impression Accuracy 
 
Parameter Estimate (SE) 
Fixed Effects  
            Intercept -0.02 (0.06) 
            Distinctive Accuracy 0.28 (0.08)* 
            Normative Accuracy 0.72 (0.08)*** 
            Distinctive Assumed Similarity 0.11 (0.01)*** 
            Distinctive Accuracy X SPT 0.01 (0.01) 
            Normative Accuracy X SPT 0.04 (0.03) 
            Distinctive Assumed Similarity X SPT 0.0003 (0.02) 
Perceivers  
Control Condition 209 
Perspective-Taking Condition 211 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001  
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Figure 3   Impression Accuracy by Condition  
 
Follow-Up Analyses 
 To better understand why the main hypothesis was not supported, follow-up analyses 
were conducted. It is possible that some perceivers in the perspective-taking condition chose not 
to perspective-take even though they were instructed to do so and that some perceivers in the 
control condition chose to perspective-take despite not being instructed to do so. If this is the 
case, then the main analysis presented above measures differences in perceptive accuracy based 
only on whether or not perceivers were instructed to perspective-take and not on whether 
perceivers actually did perspective-take. A better understanding of state perspective-taking’s 
effects on impressions can be gained by examining the relationship using perceivers who did or 
did not try to take the targets’ perspectives and by examining the relationship with perceivers 
who were or were not able to successfully take the targets’ perspectives. As such, two follow-up 
analyses were conducted based on participants’ responses to the “Try” manipulation check item 
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(“How much did you try to adopt the perspective of the individuals being interviewed?”) and the 
“Able” manipulation check item (“To what extent were you able to adopt the perspective of the 
individuals being interviewed?”). The same data analytic procedure used for the main hypothesis 
was used for these follow-up analyses.  
The first analysis isolated the perceivers who did and did not actively try to take the 
targets’ perspectives while still maintaining the distinction between conditions. This analysis 
included only participants in the control condition who responded to the “Try” manipulation 
check item with a “1” (N = 6) or “2” (N = 18; indicating that they did not try to take the targets’ 
perspectives) and participants in the perspective-taking condition who responded to the “Try” 
item with a “4” (N = 93) or “5” (N = 108; indicating that they did try to take the targets’ 
perspectives). For those perceivers, there was not a significant difference in distinctive accuracy 
between the conditions. However, there was a significant difference in normative accuracy 
between the two conditions. Perceivers in the perspective-taking condition who reported trying 
to take the targets’ perspectives viewed the targets with significantly greater positivity 
(normative accuracy) than those in the control condition who reported not trying to take the 
targets’ perspectives. Finally, there was not a significant difference in the levels of distinctive 
assumed similarity in perceivers’ judgments between the two conditions (see Table 5 and Figure 
4). In sum, when limiting the sample to only those perceivers who did or did not try to 
perspective-take, there is still no evidence that state perspective-taking improves the ability to 
accurately judge another’s unique personality or that state perspective-taking changes the extent 
to which a perceiver views a target as having a similar personality to themselves. However, there 
is evidence that trying to take a target’s perspective does increase the positivity of a perceiver’s 
impression. 
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Table 5   Follow-Up Analysis Based on Responses to “Try” Manipulation Check Item (Control 
Condition 1 and 2, Perspective-Taking Condition 4 and 5) 
 
Parameter Estimate (SE) 
Fixed Effects  
Intercept 0.03 (0.08) 
Distinctive Accuracy 0.29 (0.09)** 
Normative Accuracy 0.63 (0.10)*** 
Distinctive Assumed Similarity 0.08 (0.03)* 
Distinctive Accuracy X SPT 0.004 (0.03) 
Normative Accuracy X SPT 0.13 (0.06)* 
Distinctive Assumed Similarity X SPT 0.03 (0.03) 
Perceivers  
Control Condition 24 
Perspective-Taking Condition 199 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001  
 
 
 
Figure 4   Accuracy by Condition for “Try” Item Follow-Up Analysis 
 
The second analysis isolated the perceivers who were and were not able to successfully 
take the targets’ perspectives while again maintaining the distinction between conditions. In the 
second follow-up analysis, only participants in the control condition who responded to the 
“Able” item with a “1” (N = 8) or “2” (N = 23; indicating that they were unsuccessful in taking 
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the targets’ perspectives) and participants in the perspective-taking condition who responded to 
the “Able” item with a “4” (N = 116) or “5” (N = 28; indicating that they were successful in 
taking the targets’ perspectives) were included. For these perceivers, distinctive accuracy did not 
differ significantly between the conditions. However, perceivers in the perspective-taking 
condition did make judgments significantly higher in normative accuracy (positivity) than 
perceivers in the control condition. Lastly, there was no difference in distinctive assumed 
similarity between the conditions (see Table 6 and Figure 5). Thus, when restricting the sample 
to only those perceivers who reported being able or not able to take the targets’ perspectives, 
there is again no evidence that state perspective-taking causes perceivers to judge targets’ unique 
personalities more accurately or that state perspective-taking alters the extent to which a 
perceiver views a target as being similar to themselves. Yet, there is evidence that being able to 
take a target’s perspective results in more positive impressions of that target.  
 
Table 6  Follow-Up Analysis Based on Responses to “Able” Manipulation Check Item (Control 
Condition 1 and 2, Perspective-Taking Condition 4 and 5) 
 
Parameter Estimate (SE) 
Fixed Effects  
Intercept 0.02 (0.07) 
Distinctive Accuracy 0.28 (0.09)* 
Normative Accuracy 0.59 (0.09)*** 
Distinctive Assumed Similarity 0.06 (0.03)* 
Distinctive Accuracy X SPT 0.02 (0.03) 
Normative Accuracy X SPT 0.17 (0.06)** 
Distinctive Assumed Similarity X SPT 0.06 (0.03) 
Perceivers  
Control Condition 31 
PT Condition 142 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001  
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Figure 5   Accuracy by Condition for “Able” Item Follow-Up analysis 
 
Attention, Liking, and Perceived Closeness 
Attention, liking, and perceived closeness were mechanisms expected to play a role in the 
relationship between perspective-taking and distinctive accuracy, normative accuracy, and 
distinctive assumed similarity, respectively. Average attention was determined by averaging 
participants’ responses to two items measuring attention (r = 0.71, p < 0.01), and average liking 
was measured by averaging participants’ responses to two items measuring liking (r = 0.80, p < 
0.01). Perceived closeness was measured using one item. Contrary to what was expected, 
perceivers in the perspective-taking condition did not report paying significantly more attention 
on average toward the targets compared to perceivers in the control condition (b = -0.02, p = 
0.71), and they did not report significantly greater liking for the targets compared to perceivers in 
the control condition (b = 0.04, p = 0.34). Moreover, perceivers in the perspective-taking 
condition did not report significantly greater levels of perceived closeness between themselves 
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and the targets compared to perceivers in the control condition (b = -0.05, p = 0.44). Thus, there 
is no evidence that state perspective-taking impacts attention, liking, or perceived closeness.  
 
Exploratory Analyses: Trait Perspective-Taking  
 An exploratory analysis was conducted to assess the moderating role of trait perspective-
taking on the effect of state perspective-taking in impressions. Trait perspective-taking did not 
significantly moderate the relationship between state perspective-taking and distinctive accuracy, 
the relationship between state perspective-taking and normative accuracy, or the relationship 
between state perspective-taking and distinctive assumed similarity (see Table 7). Thus, a 
perceiver’s existing level of perspective-taking tendencies did not play a role in how much state 
perspective-taking influenced his/her impressions. 
 
Table 7   Trait Perspective-Taking (TPT) as a Moderator of State Perspective-Taking (SPT) and 
Impressions 
 
Parameter Estimate (SE) 
Fixed Effects  
Intercept -0.02 (0.06) 
Distinctive Accuracy 0.28 (0.08)* 
Normative Accuracy 0.71 (0.08)*** 
Distinctive Assumed Similarity 0.10 (0.01)*** 
Distinctive Accuracy X SPT 0.01 (0.01) 
Normative Accuracy X SPT 0.05 (0.03) 
Distinctive Assumed Similarity X SPT 0.005 (0.02) 
Distinctive Accuracy X TPT 0.003 (0.01) 
Normative Accuracy X TPT 0.05 (0.02)* 
Distinctive Assumed Similarity X TPT 0.01 (0.01) 
Distinctive Accuracy X SPT X TPT 0.009 (0.02) 
Normative Accuracy X SPT X TPT 0.01 (0.03) 
Distinctive Assumed Similarity X SPT X TPT 0.008 (0.02) 
Perceivers 416 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001  
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 To assess the role of trait perspective-taking in impressions in general and to determine if 
the results of Colman et al. (2017) were replicated, a moderation analysis was first conducted 
collapsed across conditions. On average, perceivers higher in trait perspective-taking formed 
impressions higher in normative accuracy, but not distinctive accuracy or distinctive assumed 
similarity. Second, the same moderation analysis was conducted for only perceivers in the 
control condition. This analysis of the control condition is most comparable to that conducted by 
Colman et al. (2017). For those in the control condition, greater trait perspective-taking was 
associated with greater normative accuracy, but not greater distinctive accuracy or distinctive 
assumed similarity. Third, the moderation analysis was conducted for only perceivers in the 
perspective-taking condition. For those in the perspective-taking condition, greater trait 
perspective-taking was associated with greater normative accuracy, but not greater distinctive 
accuracy or distinctive assumed similarity (see Table 8). Thus, trait perspective-taking was only 
consistently related to greater normative accuracy and was not associated with greater distinctive 
accuracy or distinctive assumed similarity. As such, these results do not fully replicate those of 
Colman et al. (2017).  
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Table 8   Trait Perspective-Taking (TPT) as a Moderator of Impressions 
 
 Collapsed 
Across 
Conditions 
Control 
Condition 
Perspective-
Taking Condition 
Parameter Estimates (SE) Estimates (SE) Estimates (SE) 
Fixed Effects    
Intercept -0.02 (0.06) -0.02 (0.06) -0.02 (0.06) 
      Distinctive Accuracy 0.28 (0.08)* 0.29 (0.08)** 0.29 (0.08)* 
      Normative Accuracy 0.73 (0.08)*** 0.71 (0.08)*** 0.75 (0.08)*** 
      Distinctive Assumed Similarity 0.11 (0.01)*** 0.11 (0.01)*** 0.11 (0.01)*** 
      Distinctive Accuracy X TPT 0.01 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
      Normative Accuracy X TPT 0.05 (0.01)*** 0.05 (0.02)* 0.06 (0.02)** 
Distinctive Assumed Similarity 
X TPT 
0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 
Perceivers 416 207 209 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
This study examined whether actively taking another’s perspective when forming first 
impressions improves personality judgment accuracy and positivity and changes the extent to 
which a perceiver views a target as having a similar personality to themselves. Previous research 
has found that individuals with greater perspective-taking tendencies (those higher in trait 
perspective-taking) tend to form personality judgments that are high in distinctive accuracy, 
normative accuracy, and distinctive assumed similarity (Colman et al., 2017). The purpose of the 
current study was to examine the causality of these relationships; that is, whether state 
perspective-taking causes more distinctively and normatively accurate judgments, as well as 
judgments greater in distinctive assumed similarity. Perceivers who were instructed to take the 
targets’ perspectives did report trying and being able to perspective-take significantly more than 
perceivers who were not instructed to take the targets’ perspectives. However, the results of this 
study find no evidence that state perspective-taking causes improved perceptive accuracy or 
changes how similar a perceiver views a target as being to themselves, but state perspective-
taking may improve impression positivity if perceivers are instructed to perspective-take and 
consequently try or are able to successfully take another’s perspective.  
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Interpretation of Results 
Distinctive Accuracy 
Contrary to what was predicted, state perspective-taking did not improve distinctive 
accuracy. Perceivers who were instructed to take the targets’ perspectives did not judge the 
targets’ unique personalities any more accurately than perceivers who were not instructed to take 
the targets’ perspectives. This was the case even for perceivers who reported actively trying or 
being able to perspective-take. The theoretical rationale for state perspective-taking’s effects on 
perceivers’ ability to detect target cues (potentially through greater attention) and utilize target 
cues (potentially through greater cognitive complexity) in order to form more distinctively 
accurate personality impressions was strong. Yet, these findings are in line with recent research 
indicating that perspective-taking does not improve interpersonal accuracy. Research using 
standard tests and measures of interpersonal accuracy has shown that state perspective-taking 
does not improve perceivers’ ability to accurately judge others’ thoughts, emotions, or attitudes 
(Eyal et al., 2018). While the present study utilized realistic estimates of accuracy, the conclusion 
that state perspective-taking does not improve personality judgment accuracy is in line with the 
previous research on empathic accuracy and extends this to include personality impressions.  
Additionally, the ineffectiveness of state perspective-taking in improving distinctive 
accuracy provides evidence that perceptive accuracy may be a fairly stable individual difference 
that is not easily manipulated. Indeed, only one study has successfully altered perceivers’ 
distinctive accuracy by manipulating perceivers’ accuracy motivation (Biesanz & Human, 2010). 
Thus, further research on perceiver impressions involving experimental manipulations is 
necessary to fully understand the intrapersonal variability of perceptive accuracy. If very few 
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manipulations are successful in altering perceptive accuracy, this would suggest it is a stable 
ability with little within-person variability.  
 
Cue Detection and Attention 
Given that distinctive accuracy did not improve after perspective-taking, state 
perspective-taking may not improve a perceiver’s ability to detect target cues, a step in RAM 
(Funder, 1995) that is necessary for accurate personality judgments. Given that attention toward 
a target is required for successful perspective-taking (Lin et al., 2010), it was expected that 
perspective-taking could increase a perceiver’s attention toward a target, thereby allowing the 
perceiver to better detect target cues and form more distinctively accurate judgments. However, 
there was no evidence that state perspective-taking resulted in increased attention. Thus, while 
perspective-taking requires attention, it does not increase attention. It is possible that all 
participants, regardless of condition, found the target videos interesting and were engaged in the 
study. As such, perceivers in both conditions could have already been directing a high level of 
attention to the targets such that any increase in attention as a result of perspective-taking was 
minimal.  
 
Normative Accuracy 
 Contrary to what was hypothesized, instructing perceivers to take the targets’ 
perspectives did not result in more normative, positive judgments by those perceivers. However, 
follow-up analyses indicated that state perspective-taking did increase the positivity of 
perceivers’ judgments when those perceivers were instructed to perspective-take and 
consequently tried or were able to take the targets’ perspectives. Thus, actually trying to take a 
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target’s perspective or being able to successfully take a target’s perspective may result in more 
positive impressions of that target.  
In addition, state perspective-taking was expected to increase liking and, as a result, 
normative accuracy (positivity). However, state perspective-taking did not cause greater liking 
for the perspective-taking target. This is contrary to research illustrating that state perspective-
taking promotes liking and positive evaluations of a target (Davis et al., 1996; Galinsky & 
Moskowitz, 2000). Of note, previous research demonstrating greater liking after perspective-
taking, and research on state perspective-taking in general, has typically presented targets in 
photographs or scripted interviews, and the targets are often intentionally portrayed as having 
certain salient and dominant characteristics (such as a negative stereotype). It is possible that 
perspective-taking does not affect how perceivers judge targets when those targets are in more 
naturalistic settings; that is, when perceivers are not presented with obviously defining 
characteristics and when the targets themselves control the cues they present and how they 
behave. However, it would be beneficial for future research on state perspective-taking to 
determine if this is indeed the case by employing more paradigms, such as face-to-face 
interactions, that use real people in unscripted situations as targets. 
 
Distinctive Assumed Similarity 
 Contrary to what was predicted, state perspective-taking did not increase the distinctive 
assumed similarity of perceivers’ judgments. As such, state perspective-taking did not alter the 
extent to which perceivers applied their own distinctive personality traits to the target and viewed 
the target as being similar to themselves. Perceived closeness was the proposed mechanism 
through which state perspective-taking might increase distinctive assumed similarity. However, 
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inconsistent with previous research (e.g., Davis et al., 1996; Galinsky, Wang, et al., 2008), 
perceivers in the perspective-taking condition did not indicate greater perceived closeness with 
the targets compared to perceivers in the control condition. Of note, perceived closeness was 
measured differently in the present study compared to how self-other overlap and perceived 
closeness have been measured in previous research. Past research has typically measured self-
other overlap and perceived closeness using the Inclusion of Self in Other scale (Aron et al., 
1992), which presents participants with seven pairs of circles that increasingly overlap. This 
study measured perceived closeness with a modified version of this item, in which the seven 
pairs of circles decreased in the amount that they overlapped. This methodological difference, 
and the fact that this study measured perceived closeness (a component of self-other overlap) 
rather than self-other overlap itself, may account for the inconsistency with past research. 
However, perceived closeness is a main factor of self-other overlap (Myers & Hodges, 2012), 
and future research should work to determine if perceived closeness and self-other overlap have 
differing associations with state perspective-taking, as this would have important implications in 
understanding state perspective-taking’s effects.  
 
Trait and State Perspective-Taking  
Perceivers’ levels of trait perspective-taking did not influence the relationship between 
state perspective-taking and impressions. Thus, the effectiveness of state perspective-taking did 
not change depending on the perceiver’s existing levels of trait perspective-taking. Additionally, 
in contrast to Colman and colleagues (2017), trait perspective-taking was only associated with 
greater normative accuracy and was not associated with greater distinctive accuracy or 
distinctive assumed similarity. Thus, this study only partially replicates previous research and 
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highlights that the relationship between trait perspective-taking and impressions may not be as 
robust as previously thought.  
 
Direction of Causality in the Perspective-Taking and Impressions Relationship 
Colman et al.’s (2017) study was correlational in nature, and the present study assessed 
only one of the possible causal directions. However, results from this study provide no evidence 
that perspective-taking causes greater perceptive accuracy. As such, it is possible that the 
direction of causality between trait perspective-taking and impressions is opposite of what was 
expected and that perceptive accuracy causes greater perspective-taking tendencies. Potentially, 
over time and with practice, as individuals develop the ability to consistently form accurate 
personality judgments, their tendency to see others’ points of view and take others’ perspectives 
(trait perspective-taking) may also increase. If greater perceptive accuracy causes greater 
perspective-taking tendencies, then this could explain the present study’s overall null findings. 
Additionally, it is possible that the correlational relationship between perspective-taking 
and impression is due to another underlying variable. Other characteristics that are consistently 
correlated with trait perspective-taking, such as healthy interpersonal functioning and a higher 
sensitivity to others feelings and reactions (Davis, 1983), may account for the relationship 
between trait perspective-taking and distinctive accuracy, normative accuracy, and distinctive 
assumed similarity found by Colman et al. (2017). Indeed, if this is the case, then the overall lack 
of a relationship between state perspective-taking and impressions in this study are to be 
expected because trait perspective-taking (and consequently state perspective-taking) would not 
be directly related to impressions.  
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The Equivalence of Trait and State Perspective-Taking 
 These findings also provide implications regarding the relationship between state and 
trait perspective-taking as evidenced by their differing associations with impressions. 
Perspective-taking research has typically treated trait and state perspective-taking as different 
manifestations of the same process, but comparisons between the results of the current study and 
those of Colman et al. (2017) do not provide such a clear conclusion. The idea of trait-state 
isomorphism is that the consequences of states and traits should be the same (Fleeson, 2001; 
Fleeson, Malanos, & Achille, 2002). Thus, if trait perspective-taking and state perspective-taking 
do not result in the same outcomes, it is unlikely that they are simply different forms of the same 
process. Based on the findings of this study, there are two possible conclusions to be drawn 
regarding the relationship between trait and state perspective-taking.  
 The first possibility is that state and trait perspective-taking are not equivalent processes 
because they are not related to the same constructs in the same way. The present research 
provided no evidence that state perspective-taking is related to distinctive accuracy or distinctive 
assumed similarity, despite previous research showing a relationship between trait perspective-
taking and these components of impressions (Colman et al., 2017). Thus, by the argument of 
trait-state isomorphism, state and trait perspective-taking may not be equivalent processes 
because they do not demonstrate the same outcomes. Thus, researchers should consider the 
possibility that trait and state perspective-taking are not identical processes when 
operationalizing perspective-taking in future research. 
 The second possibility is that state and trait perspective-taking are equivalent processes, 
but they are only associated with normative accuracy in first impressions. In the present study, 
trait perspective-taking was only related to normative accuracy, and state perspective-taking was 
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associated with greater normative accuracy (but not distinctive accuracy or distinctive assumed 
similarity) for perceivers who reported trying or being able to perspective-take. As such, both 
forms of perspective-taking were associated with the same outcome, which would be expected if 
they are identical processes. If this is the case, then the relationship between trait perspective-
taking and distinctive accuracy and distinctive assumed similarity found by Colman et al. (2017) 
may be attributed to other characteristics that are associated with trait perspective-taking (e.g., 
healthy interpersonal functioning or greater sensitivity to other’s thoughts and feelings).   
  
Limitations and Future Research 
Ceiling Effects with Good Targets 
Using good targets may have produced ceiling effects and, in a sense, restricted the range 
of perspective-taking’s effects. Good targets were used in this study because a perceiver can only 
form an accurate personality judgment if a target is first providing adequate trait-relevant cues 
(Rogers & Biesanz, 2018). Judgment accuracy tends to increase as targets provide a greater 
quantity of cues and better quality cues (Letzring, Wells, & Funder, 2006), but the targets in the 
present study may have provided such a large quantity of high quality cues that perspective-
taking did not provide perceivers with any additional information, and any perceiver could have 
easily detected and interpreted the targets’ cues, regardless of condition. Perspective-taking may 
be more useful when the target’s personality-relevant cues are not obvious and readily available. 
If a target provides a lower quantity of cues or lower quality cues, perspective-taking may allow 
perceivers to detect and utilize more information than could be gained without perspective-
taking. As such, future research should use a range of good and moderate targets to determine 
whether perspective-taking is effective for other types of targets. 
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Lack of Dissimilarity  
 State perspective-taking’s ineffectiveness in improving impression accuracy in the 
present study could be due to a lack of dissimilarity between the targets and the perceivers. The 
targets and perceivers were already similar: most were around the same age, all were attending 
the same university, most were living in the same city, 71.1% of perceivers were the same 
ethnicity as the targets, and 77.9% were the same gender as six out of the seven targets. Indeed, a 
large limitation of the study is that all targets were white and only one target was male. As such, 
the targets were not drastically and obviously different from the majority of perceivers on many 
characteristics. Perspective-taking can only be impactful if the target is sufficiently recognized as 
being distinct from the self (Sassenrath et al., 2014; Todd et al., 2011), so such great similarity 
between targets and perceivers and a lack of diversity among targets may have lessened 
perspective-taking’s effects. Findings from Colman et al. (2017) further support this idea. In 
three of their four samples, participants were recruited from MTurk, and the average age 
difference between targets and perceivers was over 10 years. As such, the perceivers were older 
and likely had more diverse backgrounds and perspectives compared to the targets. The 
dissimilarity between perceivers and targets may have contributed to the relationship between 
trait perspective-taking and accurate impressions found by Colman et al. (2017). Future research 
should aim to use targets and perceivers who are dissimilar from one another to determine 
whether greater dissimilarity does in fact lead to greater state perspective-taking effects.  
 
Video Impressions vs. Face-to-Face Impressions 
 This study used a video impressions paradigm, and this allowed for the direct 
examination of perceiver effects while holding target effects constant. However, a more 
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comprehensive understanding of the relationship between state perspective-taking and 
impressions could be found by examining state perspective-taking’s effects in face-to-face 
interactions. With a face-to-face interaction paradigm, researchers can assess how state 
perspective-taking impacts a target’s cue relevance and cue availability in addition to a 
perceiver’s ability to detect and utilize cues. In face-to-face interactions, a perceiver’s behaviors 
can influence the likelihood that a target will make trait-relevant cues available. For instance, 
targets tend to express more cues that are relevant to their true personality when perceivers create 
interaction atmospheres that allow a target to feel comfortable doing so (Letzring, 2008). State 
perspective-taking could alter how a perceiver interacts with a target (such as increasing the 
interest a perceiver displays in getting to know and understand the target), thereby influencing 
the relevance and availability of a target’s cues. Additionally, given that Colman et al. (2017) 
also used a video impression paradigm, future research could examine the impact of trait 
perspective-taking in face-to-face interactions. It is possible that trait perspective-taking may 
have a different association with impression accuracy when perceivers interact with a target face-
to-face. Overall, future research would benefit from examining the effects of both trait and state 
perspective-taking in face-to-face interactions in order to arrive at a more comprehensive 
understanding of perspective-taking’s relationship with impressions. 
 
Determining Other Methods to Improve Impression Accuracy 
 Finally, given the important consequences of impressions, future research should aim to 
determine other methods to improve impression accuracy. The expectation that state perspective-
taking would be a method to increase both the distinctive accuracy and positivity (normative 
accuracy) of perceivers’ judgments was not supported. Currently, only accuracy motivation has 
 58 
been established as a means of increasing distinctive accuracy, but this comes at the cost of 
impression positivity (Biesanz & Human, 2010). Because first impressions can influence a 
perceiver’s future decisions and behaviors toward a target, it would be beneficial to determine a 
practical method for everyday interpersonal interactions that would allow perceivers to 
accurately judge others’ unique personalities while still viewing them positively. Thus, future 
research should work to determine effective and easy-to-implement methods to improve both the 
accuracy and positivity of first impressions. If very few methods are successful in improving 
these components of impressions, this would suggest that perceptive accuracy is in fact a stable 
individual difference that is unlikely to be easily improved.  
 
Conclusion 
 This research provides evidence that taking another’s perspective does not result in more 
accurate first impressions of that person and does not alter how a perceiver views that person in 
relation to themselves. However, this study does suggest that actively trying to or being able to 
take another’s perspective may result in more positive impressions of that individual. These 
findings contribute to perspective-taking literature by examining the effects of state perspective-
taking in the realm of realistic personality judgments and by providing evidence that trait and 
state perspective-taking may not be identical processes. Moreover, these findings can inform the 
impressions literature in general by contributing to the understanding of what processes facilitate 
and directly improve first impression accuracy. Overall, while taking another person’s 
perspective when first meeting him/her will not necessarily improve the accuracy of one’s first 
impressions, it does not hurt impression accuracy. In fact, trying to see another person from 
his/her own point of view may help one to view that person a little more positively.  
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Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you.  For example, do you agree 
that you are someone who likes to spend time with others?  Please write a number next to each 
statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree 
strongly 
 
Disagree 
 
 
Disagree 
a little 
Neutral Agree a 
little 
Agree 
 
Agree 
strongly 
 
1. Is bashful. 
2. Is bold 
3. Is careless 
4. Is cold 
5. Is complex 
6. Is cooperative 
7. Is creative 
8. Is deep 
9. Is disorganized 
10. Is efficient 
11. Is energetic 
12. Is envious 
13. Is extraverted 
14. Is fretful 
15. Is harsh 
16. Is imaginative  
17. Is inefficient 
18. Is intellectual 
19. Is jealous 
20. Is kind 
21. Is moody 
22. Is organized 
23. Is philosophical 
24. Is practical 
25. Is quiet 
26. Is relaxed 
27. Is rude 
28. Is shy 
29. Is sloppy 
30. Is sympathetic 
31. Is systematic 
32. Is talkative 
33. Is temperamental 
34. Is touchy 
35. Is uncreative 
36. Is unenvious 
37. Is unintellectual 
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38. Is unsympathetic 
39. Is warm 
40. Is withdrawn 
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Please write the number that indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with that 
statement: I see this person as someone who…  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree 
strongly 
 
Disagree 
 
 
Disagree 
a little 
Neutral Agree a 
little 
Agree 
 
Agree 
strongly 
 
1. Is bashful. 
2. Is bold 
3. Is careless 
4. Is cold 
5. Is complex 
6. Is cooperative 
7. Is creative 
8. Is deep 
9. Is disorganized 
10. Is efficient 
11. Is energetic 
12. Is envious 
13. Is extraverted 
14. Is fretful 
15. Is harsh 
16. Is imaginative  
17. Is inefficient 
18. Is intellectual 
19. Is jealous 
20. Is kind 
21. Is moody 
22. Is organized 
23. Is philosophical 
24. Is practical 
25. Is quiet 
26. Is relaxed 
27. Is rude 
28. Is shy 
29. Is sloppy 
30. Is sympathetic 
31. Is systematic 
32. Is talkative 
33. Is temperamental 
34. Is touchy 
35. Is uncreative 
36. Is unenvious 
37. Is unintellectual 
38. Is unsympathetic 
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39. Is warm 
40. Is withdrawn 
41. Is bright 
42. Is very likeable 
43. Is engaging and interesting 
44. Held my attention for most of the clip 
45. Is from the same cultural or ethnic group as me 
46. Has a similar accent or way of speaking as me 
 
 
47. Please circle the picture or letter below which best depicts you in relation to the person you 
just met 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not At All 
 
 
 
 Neutral   A Great 
Deal 
 
48. How much do you like this person overall?  
48. How much do you trust this person? 
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Davis (1980) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Does not 
describe 
me well 
     Describes 
me very 
well 
 
1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me.  
2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.  
3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.*  
4. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.  
5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.  
6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.  
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely caught 
up in it.  
8. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.* 
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.  
10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.  
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective.*  
12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me.  
13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm.  
14. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.  
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's 
arguments.*  
16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters.  
17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.  
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them.  
19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.  
20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 
21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.*  
22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.  
23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading character.  
24. I tend to lose control during emergencies.  
25. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.*  
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the events in 
the story were happening to me.  
27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.  
28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.*  
 
*Indicates perspective-taking subscale item 
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1. Your gender:       Male     Female     Prefer not to answer     Other ___________ 
2. Your age: ___________ 
3. Your major ethnic background (e.g., Caucasian, Hispanic) ___________ 
4. What is your major? ___________ 
5. What is your class rank?       Freshman     Sophomore     Junior     Senior     Other __________ 
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